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Abstract
In this paper I’ll develop a criticism of Woods’ Truth in Fiction, concerning
the book’s epistemicist treatment of issues of referential indeterminacy raised
by the account of truth and reference in it. The criticism is meant as a chal-
lenge for the author to elaborate on the view of reference and the account of
indeterminacy advanced in the book. I’ll proceed by outlining a contrasting
view on those issues that I take to be otherwise close to those in the book, in
that it validates the data that it wants to honor, as summarized in the précis,
in very similar terms to those favored in the book.
1 Introduction
In this paper I’ll elaborate on a criticism of Woods’ Truth in Fiction (‘TiF’) that
I succinctly presented in my NDPR 2018 review, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/
truth-in-fiction-rethinking-its-logic/. The criticism concerns the book’s
epistemicist treatment of issues of referential indeterminacy raised by the account of
truth and reference in it (not rehearsed in the précis above). I don’t have a knock-
down argument against the views I’ll question. I’ll just proceed in the way I think
best in philosophy in general, i.e., abductively: I’ll present a view on those issues
that I take to be close to those in TiF in that it validates the data that the book
wants to honor, summarized in the précis, in very similar terms to those favored in
the book, and I’ll explain why it is preferable. The view in question, which I’ll call
Fictional Contextualist Realism (‘FCR’), like Woods’ rejects the “Fiction Law”, IV
in the précis. I myself don’t endorse FCR. I am what Woods calls a pretendist about
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fiction and a fictionalist about fictional objects and apparent reference to them,1
and I thereby endorse the Fiction Law. But as I have explained elsewhere,2 FCR
is a very convenient fiction in the path to getting hold of the right view on these
matters, only to kick off the ladder once that is achieved. I’ll present FCR in the
next section, and then I’ll move to present the indeterminacy objection.
2 Fictional Realist Contextualism
I’ll start by circumscribing our topic. Let us assume that an assertion is what is
done by default by means of declarative sentences: “[i]n natural language, the default
use of declarative sentences is to make assertions” [69, p. 258].3 It is a feature of
assertions that we evaluate them as correct or otherwise depending on whether they
are true. Let us thus consider three sorts of prima facie assertoric uses made with
declaratives in discourses involving fictions:
1. When Gregor Samsa woke, he found himself transformed into a gigantic ver-
min.
2. According to Metamorphosis, when Gregor Samsa woke, he found himself
transformed into a gigantic vermin.
3. Gregor Samsa is a fictional character.
Consider first an utterance of (1) by Kafka, as part of the longer utterance by him of
the full discourse which, with a measure of idealization, we can think constitutes the
act of putting forward his Metamorphosis for us to enjoy. I’ll assume Woods’ précis
logico-semantic “default data” in characterizing these fictional uses of declaratives,
which I will call textual:4 even when, taken literally as assertions, they contradict
what we believe, we don’t find any tension in accepting them and we wouldn’t find
it plausible to criticize Kafka on this regard.5
The other two types differ in that they fail to have this feature. There is, firstly,
the use of sentences such as (1) to report on what goes on in a fiction, that is, the
character of the fictional world it presents, its plot. I will call these plot-reporting
1García-Carpintero [19, 20] offer recent presentations of the versions of these views that I sub-
scribe. I’ll also borrow from the latter.
2 Cf. García-Carpintero [16, 20, 21].
3Cf. García-Carpintero [22] for elaboration and defense.
4I borrow this and the other two related labels from Bonomi [3].
5My own pretendist take on this adopts instead Currie’s [9] view that such acts are speech acts
proper, with specific force and contents (fiction-making, as he calls them), cf. García-Carpintero
[19]; but, as indicated, for most of the paper I’ll put that aside.
178
Referential Indeterminacy in Fiction
uses paratextual; according to Lewis [32] and others, they are simply elliptic for
intuitively equivalent ascriptions of propositional content like (2), which on such
grounds I’ll also count as paratextual. Readers of Metamorphosis would count (1)
in such a use as straightforwardly, actually true, as they would (2), and reject the
results of substituting ‘rat’ for ‘vermin’ in them. Finally, I will call the uses of
sentences such as (3) metatextual; they also intuitively are truth-evaluable vis-à-vis
actuality but not content-reporting, in that they are not (obviously) equivalent to
explicit content ascriptions like (2).
Having made the distinction of our three kinds of fictional discourse, I will hence-
forth set aside the last two in order to focus on textual uses, which I take to be what
TiF is mostly about — the two pieces of default data (logico-semantic and psycho-
epistemic) that the précis highlights as explanatory goals concern them. In order
to explain them, Woods thinks that we need to treat textual uses as assertoric,
as putting forward true claims.6 As indicated above, this is a view that has been
advanced before. Thus, Ludlow [33], Manning [34], Martinich and Stroll [36] and
Orlando [39] hold related views. But I want to focus here on the contextualist views
defended by Predelli [42], Recanati [45, pp. 213–226], Reimer [47] and Voltolini [64].
The context in which ‘The battle happened here.’ is uttered might require us
to evaluate the assertion not with respect to the place where the utterance occurs
but another, contextually provided location. This notoriously applies in “answering
machine” cases, in free indirect speech and other cases. On the authors’ views, the
context of textual uses of (1) similarly leads us to evaluate their truth not at the
actual world, but at a counterfactual or imaginary one, “the” world of the fiction —
actually, a plurality thereof if this is theoretically explicated by means of standard
possible worlds ideology.7 Predelli [42] only considers examples involving real names,
but he extends the view to cases involving fictional names, arguing that they refer
to ficta — actual abstract created existents [43].8 Which entities are these?
Kripke [29, based on talks originally delivered in 1973] argues that a proper
account of metatextual uses requires interpreting names such as ‘Gregor Samsa’
in them as referring to fictional entities. Van Inwagen [63] provides an influential
Quinean argument for such realism about fictional entities. For both Kripke and van
6Woods might cite in support empirical evidence from Piccinini and Scott [41].
7To insist once more, I don’t think it is a good idea to count textual uses as assertions, to
be evaluated as literally true or untrue, except that not at the actual world but at “the” world
of the fiction (see Urmson [62], Walton [66, pp. 41–2], Everett [12]). I find it more accurate the
“pragmatic” view that they are simply not assertions, but alternative acts to be evaluated with
respect to norms other than truth vis-à-vis the character of “the” fictional world they represent.
8Reimer [47] disclaims ontological commitments for her view, arguing that fictional utterances
have truth-conditions but not propositional contents; Martinich and Stroll [36] suggest a similar
view. My (minimalist) view of contents doesn’t allow for that distinction.
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Inwagen, such ficta are abstract existent entities of various sorts, Platonic abstracta
like Wolterstorff’s [71] or Currie’s [9] roles, or rather created artefacts, as in Salmon
[50], Thomasson [58, 59] or Schiffer [52].9 Such realists think of fictional characters
as having an ontological status analogous to that of the fictional works in which they
occur (Thomasson [58, p. 143]; Walters [65]), and I’ll assume something similar.10
Fictional works result from the communicative acts of fiction-makers; they are social
constructs, abstract created artefacts with norm-regulated functions.11 They have
a complex structure, grounded on the vehicles that express them; they are in part
composed of singular representations (more on this below, ¶3). It is these singular
representations what I’ll take fictional characters to be: on the proposal, terms like
‘Gregor Samsa’ in textual uses of (1) have as semantic value a singular representation
associated with that name, which is a constituent of Kafka’s Metamorphosis. (1)
makes a true assertion about it, even if in some sense it is also about its (non-existent,
in this case) referent.12
There is a well-known wrinkle in this proposal. While the entities that realists
posit may well instantiate the properties predicated of them in metatextual uses like
(3), this is not so clear for the two other uses. Such entities are not easily taken to
be the sort of thing capable of waking or going to sleep, for these capacities appear
to require having causal powers that abstract objects, created or Platonic, appear
to lack. We will deal with this in a standard way, by distinguishing two types of
predication, having and holding. The subject-predicate combination in (1) does not
mean that the semantic value assigned to the subject-term truly instantiates (has)
the property expressed by the predicate, but merely that the former represents
9Kroon and Voltolini [31] offer helpful discussion and further references.
10To be clear about the extent of my fictionalism about the fictional characters I’ll take FCR
to assume, let me say that I share a point Everett [12, p. 143] makes: “I do not mean to deny
that in some cases the entities invoked by certain fictional realists, who then go on to identify these
entities with fictional characters, genuinely exist. My complaint is simply that, in these cases, the
relevant entities are not fictional characters; the identification made is wrong”; cf. also Brock [4,
pp. 352–3]. I don’t have ontological qualms about Thomasson’s fictional characters, but I don’t
think we need to take referential expressions in textual discourse to refer to them to understand
how they work. As I’ll indicate below (fn. 17), like Thomasson [61, p. 262] I am not much disturbed
by Brock [4] main criticism of created fictional characters. Everett and Schroeder’s [13] alternative
proposal that they are spatially discontinuous concrete “ideas for fictional characters” is insightful.
I cannot go here into the reasons why I think the social construct account is more apt, nor address
the intuitions that they (ibid., 284-5) marshal against it.
11There is no difference in these respects with other communicative acts; they also generate
(when they don’t misfire) social constructs of that kind, cf. García-Carpintero [23].
12For reasons I have provided elsewhere (García-Carpintero [24], if we think of textual uses of
declaratives as assertions as suggested so far, we should take both expressions like ‘Pierre Bezhukov’
in War and Peace which don’t pick out any actual person, and those like ‘Napoleon’ in there which
do, as equally having representations as semantic values.
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something to which the latter is ascribed in its encompassing fiction (holds). This
helps with a point that Everett [12, pp. 163–178] emphasizes, that there are many
mixed cases such as (4) below:
4. At the start ofMetamorphosis, Gregor Samsa — an emotional alter ego created
by Kafka for that novel — finds himself transformed into a gigantic vermin.
Following Everett and Schroeder [13, pp. 286–8]; Walters [65] and Recanati [46], we
explain such mixed cases in that they involve a form of independently well-attested
metonymy-induced, “regular” polysemy, as when we straightforwardly apply ‘lion’
and ‘ferocious’ to a lion-representation that literally, primarily is not a lion, like a
sculpture of one; for we also naturally find similarly mixed cases there. Thus, a
sculptor can say this of one of her creations:
5. That lion is the best sculpture I’ve made this month; it is as ferocious as the
one we saw yesterday at the zoo.
FCR similarly takes the inserted metatextual claim in (4) to involve straightforward,
having predication, while the one in the main clause is rather of the holding variety:
we are just saying of the relevant Samsa-representation that it represents someone
to which, in the work, the predicate applies — the way the statue is metonymically
said in (5) to represent a ferocious lion.
I take the outlined FCR view to be close to Woods’. In his preferred “Aris-
totelian” way of accounting for the logico-semantic datum, truth is relativized to
“respects”, which I take to be truth-making situations playing the theoretical roles
of possible worlds. This is what FCR suggests: taken as a standard assertion, (1)
is about the actual world and would be untrue, but taken with respect to Meta-
morphosis fictional world, it is true. Woods doesn’t elaborate at length on how
his view accounts for the psycho-epistemic datum, but, as I have argued elsewhere
(García-Carpintero [25]), FCR also helps here. The “intense and physically mani-
fested emotions about things that they know never happened” the datum concerns
are an aspect of what psychologists call “transportation” to or “immersion” into the
fictional world of a story. Some writers (e.g. Stock [54]) have suggested that the
imaginings prompted by fictions have the “direction of fit” of beliefs; I have pointed
out (op. cit., see also Chasid [8] for a related view) that this is straightforwardly so
assuming FCR — for such imaginings would then just be beliefs about the fictional
world — and that it affords a good explanation of immersion, hence of Woods’
datum. Needless to say, I don’t take this explanatory fact as ultimately favoring
realism; as I explain in the referenced work, a pretendist stance of the kind I hold
affords an at the very least equally good explanation.
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3 Indeterminacy Worries about Fictional Reference
I move now to present my objection to TiF. It relates to one of the main reasons I
have to prefer irrealist views to proposals like the just outlined FCR. Realist views
raise well-known indeterminacy concerns, echoing Quine’s [44, p. 23] indictment of
one of its versions: “the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible
bald man in that doorway [. . . ] [a]re they the same possible man, or two possible
men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are
there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike?” Everett
[11], [12, Ch 8] and Kroon [30] provide good elaborations; Bueno and Zalta [6, pp.
761–4] acknowledge this as a main concern. In what remains I’ll explain how the
problem arises for FCR, how it may be addressed by it (and even better by the
fictionalist final mutation that I support), and why it challenges Woods’ alternative
epistemicists suggestions.
FCR offers a theoretically coherent semantic account of textual discourse; al-
though I haven’t gone into it here, it can be implemented in the best developed cur-
rent formal proposals. For such semantics to be vindicated, FCR needs an adequate
metasemantics (García-Carpintero [22]). The one I recommend (García-Carpintero
[26]) gives a central role to Williamson’s [69, p. 246] default, “flat-out” assertions,
assuming with him that they are constituted by an epistemic, truth-entailing norm,
and the knowledge-based Principle of Charity that Williamson [70, p. 264] promotes
on that assumption. Roughly, the metasemantics has it that semantic value is to
be assigned to lexical items in a way that properly explains, along teleological lines,
how such a factive epistemic norm has come to be in force for them in our commu-
nities. This involves actual cases in which speakers obeyed the norm, and hence put
forward knowledgeable, true claims. I’ll stick to my assumed fiction by granting that
FCR can be vindicated along these lines: utterers of textual discourse like (1) obey
truth-involving norms on assertion, putting their audiences in a position to acquire
knowledge, because the context with respect to which they should be evaluated is
to be shifted to a fictional world.
How would this validate the semantics outlined for ‘Gregor Samsa’ in a textual
use of (1), on which its semantic value is the very associated singular representation
found in the work? In my work on reference, I have been promoting a version
of a view that it is by now standard in current semantics (cf. García-Carpintero
[26, and references there]). On this view, referential expressions like indexicals and
proper names carry presuppositions of acquaintance, or familiarity. This is to be
cashed out by assuming that contexts include discourse referents, which we may
think of as shareable singular representations that may well not pick out anything.13
13Instead of characterizing the singular representations FCR takes fictional characters to be in
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For proper names, the relevant discourse referents are crucially defined by naming
practices (distinct ones for the ‘David’ that picks out Lewis and the one that picks
out Hume); typically already existing ones, but in some cases created with the
very discourse including the name. For indexicals, they might be constituted by
perceptual information, or information present in previous discourse to which the
expression in anaphorically linked.
FCR (and the fictionalist view that uses it as a convenient presentational device
that I endorse) holds that all this carries over to textual discourse. The singular
representations that FCR takes to be the semantic value of referential expressions
are thus to be individuated by such discourse referents.14 There a long tradition
that associates some descriptions with entities of the kind we are positing, roles (see
Rothschild [49] and Glavaničová [27]) like the president of the USA or the mayor,
and explains the intuitive difference between descriptions with rigid and non-rigid
readings in such terms (the latter intuitively define roles). For purposes of formal
modeling, roles can be understood as Carnapian individual concepts picking out their
occupiers relative to worlds, to the extent that we think of them as merely partial
functions (cf. Stokke [55]). If we model the fictional world by means of standard
possible worlds, the role that we are taking as the semantic value of ‘Gregor Samsa’
will pick out different individuals in different such worlds.
The ‘Samsa’ example would be quite adequate to explain how the indeterminacy
worry arises for the brand of fictional realism that I am assuming,15 but I’ll present it
with a more dramatic illustration. The great Honduran writer Augusto Monterroso
produced excellent micro-stories; one of his most celebrated, The Dinosaur, consists
of just one sentence:
6. When he awoke, the dinosaur was still there.
What exactly is the shape of the semantic value that FCR ascribes to ‘he’? Which
terms of discourse referents we could invoke mental files, insofar as we think of them as public
and normatively characterized; cf. Orlando [39], Terrone [57]. What about expressions of plural
reference, like ‘the Hobbits’, or ‘the Dwarves’ (Kroon [30])? I assume these could be handled in a
related way, given an adequate semantic account for them; cf. Moltmann [38] for discussion of how
such an account should look like.
14This semantic proposal for referential expressions in textual discourse, which FCR extends to
paratextual discourse, is rather close to Frege’s view that referential expressions shift their semantic
values in intentional contexts to what in extensional contexts are their senses. If all paratextual
uses of referential expressions occur (implicitly or explicitly) in intensional contexts, as on Lewis’
[32] view, the parallel is immediate. Textual uses would also straightforwardly fit the bill if they
were also elliptical for some operator-involving analogue of (2), as Devitt [10, p. 172] defends,
cf. Orlando [39] for a related recent proposal. This is objectionable, however, as Bertolet [2] and
Predelli [42] pointed out; FCR gets essentially the same result without positing implicit operators.
15Just consider the debate between Nabokov and a critic that Friend [14] rehearses.
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features define the relevant role, determining its denotata in the worlds constituting
the fictional world? Answers will depend on the proper metasemantics for textual
discourse: perhaps it is Monterroso’s intentions that we should take into considera-
tion, or those among them that competent readers can discern in the work, or what
our current conventional interpretative practices would settle on. But whatever the
proper choice is, it is manifest that there is room for a lot of indeterminacy here.
Actually, we should start arguing about the assumption that the awaking character
is male, induced by the translation I got from Wikipedia, which is at least explicitly
absent in the Spanish original (Cuando despertó, el dinosaurio todavía estaba allí).
There is much more room for indeterminacy in addition: what is the spatiotemporal
location for the objects the discourse referent picks out in the worlds constituting
the fictional world? Earth when dinosaurs roamed it? Mexico when Monterroso
lived there, ‘the dinosaur’ being metaphorical for the PRI, as some suggest? And so
on and so forth.
Note that — as Everett [11, 12] emphasizes — on the realist assumptions we
are granting the indeterminacy at stake here appears to affect objects themselves,
and not just the linguistic expressions signifying them: it is the semantic value we
have ascribed to ‘he’ in (6) itself that appears to be indeterminate, with respect to
whether or not is to be individuated by properties like those we mentioned. Now,
as the discussion of Everett’s arguments has made clear, we should be very careful
in moving from indeterminacy in the contours of the fictional world, to indetermi-
nacy in the fictional characters themselves — in our case, the semantic values we
are ascribing to referential expressions in textual uses.16 Nonetheless, I think the
previous considerations show that fictional characters — roles — themselves are
indeterminate.
The outlined FCR proposal to individuate fictional characters in fact provides a
principled reason to go along with a suggestion made by Schnieder and von Solodkoff
[53] in response to Everett, considered by Thomasson [60, p 142], which has been
questioned as arbitrary (Caplan and Muller [7]). Everett [11, 12] uses the principle
that (roughly) indeterminate identity in the story entails indeterminate identity in
the character themselves. Schnieder and von Solodkoff reject it. They argue that,
although in the world of the Frackworld story that Everett [11] makes up it may be
indeterminate whether Frick and Frack are identical, the characters themselves are
different and hence the principle is false. To the extent that the relevant discourse
referents are different, the FCR proposal presented here provides a principled rea-
son for this.17 The proposal also validates Thomasson’s [60, p. 135] rejection of
16 Cf. Thomasson [60, pp. 132–243] for a good discussion.
17Kroon [30, pp. 165–6] suggests an alternative, which, like the one here, may have the effect that
184
Referential Indeterminacy in Fiction
another principle of Everett’s: it may be determinate that a fictional character (say,
Tolstaya’s Slynx) exist, while it is indeterminate whether there is something it picks
out in the work’s fictional world.
The ontic vagueness thus espoused by FCR, however, is not an isolated issue
affecting fictional contents, as I have shown in a critical discussion of a notorious
argument by Schiffer against supervaluationism based on related concerns (García-
Carpintero [17, 21]). It arises for any ascription of contents expressed by means of
referentially indeterminate expressions like ‘there’ (‘it was there that Alex danced’)
or ‘Kilimanjaro’: to the extent that ‘there’ is meant to refer to precise locations,
there is a plurality of candidate referents for the adverb in the relevant utterance;
the same applies to ‘Kilimanjaro’, if it is meant to pick out precise quark-constituted
mountains — just consider a quark in a candidate boundary for the mountain, and
the two aggregates including and excluding it. Now, what about the contribution of
the same expressions when we use them to report on what was said in the relevant
occasions (Schiffer [51])?
Barnes and Williams [1] make a good case that supervaluationist techniques
can be used to articulate an intelligible version of the notion of vagueness in the
world, or vague objects, and I (García-Carpintero [17, 21]) have recommended that
option to deal with Schiffer’s arguments.18 Similarly, it is (on the version of FCR
on offer) the role assigned to ‘he’ in (6) itself that can be precisified in different
ways, so that it always picks out in the world of the fiction a referent for which
(6) is true. Needless to say, any worries that my tactical espousal of FCR and the
ontic vagueness that comes with it might create would ultimately dissipate if we
could establish my true view that these entities — abstract created roles — that we
are ascribing to referential expressions in textual discourse are nothing but fictions
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde are two different characters, even though they determinately represent the
same person in the fictional world — the ordered pair <Dr. Jekyll, Mr. Hyde> has non-identity,
even though it holds identity. This is a result he welcomes, and I follow suit — although my view
allows also that the prima facie two discourse referents, and hence the two roles/fictional characters
should be merged (to put it in mental files ideology), and are thus in fact one. Brock’s [4] main
argument against creationism raises related concerns. The argument depends on an assumption
that I don’t share, that creation is a causal process. Rather, on my view creation is constitutive
— it should be conceptualized along the lines of the relation between apt declarations, like ‘you
are out’ uttered by a referee, and their institutional products. Nonetheless, Brock raises genuine
problems the form of creationism I am fictionally endorsing here, related to the ones I myself voiced
(García-Carpintero [16, pp. 150–1]). A proper response requires to go into the nature of fictional
works, which I cannot do here.
18García-Carpintero [18] defends it for indeterminacies about future contingents. Of course, it
may well be that a more traditional form of supervaluationism as modeling semantic indecision can
also handle issues of referential indeterminacy (cf. Merlo [37], Rohrs [48], Sud [56]). That would




This concludes my exposition of FCR, a view that I have argued can get the
explanatory credits that Woods’ claims for his own. It was meant to set in relief a
convenient abductive contrast for the criticism I am finally in a position to make.
In response to indeterminacy worries like those just rehearsed, Woods contends that
fictional entities like Sherlock Holmes are fully determinate objects. He relies on
a variety of the “Reality Principle” that Lewis [32] and Walton [66] take authors
and readers to assume for specifying “the site” of the story. Woods’ version (80-1)
looks to me closer to Friend’s [15, p. 29] Reality Assumption that “everything that
is (really) true is also fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work”.
I take this to be a non-starter. Woods claims that our deficit when it comes
to determining “how many strands of hair Sherlock had at 9:30 a.m. on February
14th, 1887” is exactly of the same nature as when it comes to the application of
the same property to Gladstone at the same time, or France’s head of state at 9:30
a.m. on February 14th, 2018: a merely epistemic matter, as opposed to an ontolog-
ical one (80, 118). It doesn’t take any worrying form of verificationism to dismiss
Williamson’s [68] epistemicism about vagueness; this can be done on the basis of the
metasemantics I barely outlined above. I don’t think that Williamson’s suggestions
about how linguistic use might fix the ontically fully determinate extension of ‘sort
of slightly bald’ may withstand metasemantic scrutiny (cf. Weatherson [67], Heck
[28]). I’ll leave it at that here, but this worry glaringly magnifies when we confront
Woods’ application to realism about the fictional characters mentioned in textual
discourse.
Since, on Woods’ view, Doyle’s decisions are the primary truth-makers for claims
about Sherlock, how could the world come to the rescue to determine one way or
another the facts about Sherlock’s hirsuteness? We are entitled to surmise that Doyle
never considered Williamson’s line, but, even if he did, that wouldn’t help. The
problem lies not with the vagueness of any particular term, but with how the world
might fix the number of Sherlock’s strands of hair at a given time, in the absence
of any indications from Doyle’s intentions on the matter, from our interpretative
practices, or from any feature that any plausible metasemantics I am aware of has
canvassed.20
19Thomasson [60, pp. 142–3] also suggests that ontic vagueness is unproblematic in this case given
her “easy ontology” perspective — which might give further reason to think, as I have suggested
(García-Carpintero [20]), that perhaps the differences between it and the Yablonian fictionalism I
subscribe are not that substantive (Everett [12, p. 48, fn 12]; Zalta [72]). See also Paganini [40] for
a related view.
20 The concern had in fact been anticipated by Lewis [32, p. 270]: “Is the world of Sherlock
Holmes a world where Holmes has an even or an odd number of hairs on his head at the moment
when he first meets Watson? What is Inspector Lestrade’s blood type? It is absurd to suppose that
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I cannot thus see how Woods might have a plausible answer to this concern. In
any case, I leave the question as a challenge for him; it is also meant as an invitation
to elaborate on his ontological views about fictional characters, in addition to his
metasemantics for textual discourse including apparent reference to them.
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